ORDERING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM ABROAD IN
VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW
Should a court refrain from ordering the production of documents
from abroad, solely because compliance with the order would necessitate
a violation of the laws of a foreign nation? The courts have not fully
analyzed the relevant issues presented by this problem and have reached
inconsistent results. In order that a workable solution be achieved, it
is submitted that the following vital questions must be answered: (1) Does
a court have jurisdiction to issue such an order? (2) Under what circumstances should it do so? (3) Once an order has issued, what considerations
should govern the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance?'
Courts have long been endowed with the power to order a party subject to their in personam jurisdiction to produce from abroad documents
within the party's control. 2 For a long time this power was also limited in
1 This comment is limited to an analysis of situations in which an American court
has jurisdiction over the party ordered to produce. Problems of enforcement of
American judgments abroad, or the enlistment of the aid of a foreign court to obtain
testimony or documents by means of letters rogatory will not be treated. On these
subjects, see Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil
Procedure, 61 COLUmN. L. REv. 1031 (1961).
2 This situation most often arises in the case of a corporation having offices both
in the United States and abroad. E.g., In re Nat'l Public Util. Investing Corp., 79 F.2d
302 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Ironclad Mfg. Co., 201 Fed. 66 (2d Cir. 1912); In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). If a party does not
have control over the requested documents the order may not issue. Munroe v. United
States, 216 Fed. 107 (Ist Cir. 1914). See also Note, 62 YALE L.J. 1248 (1953). At one
time this limitation on the courts' power was applied in all cases concerning banks as
a consequence of the "separate entity" theory of branch banking, by which a bank
was not considered to be in "control" of its branches. In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also United States v. Kyle, 21 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1957);
Chrzanowska v. Corn Exchange Bank, 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (1916) (branch
bank not obliged to cash check drawn on another branch of same bank); Bluebird
Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 249 N.Y.S. 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931)
(attachment proceeding brought in New York was ineffective as against an account at
the New York bank's branch in Puerto Rico); Richardson v. Richardson, [1927] P. 228
(judgment debtor's account cannot be arnished at main office of bank); Fordham,
Branch Banks as Separate Entities, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 975 (1931). However, the
limitation of the Harris case has now been abandoned and banks with foreign
branches are treated in the same manner as other corporations insofar as their obligation to produce documents is concerned. First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue
Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960). But cf. United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd en banc, 325 F.2d 1020
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accordance with the language of the first Restatement, Conflict of Laws:
"A state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts to make a decree
directing a party subject to the jurisdiction of the court to do an act in
another state, provided such act is not contrary to the law of the state in
which it is to be performed."3
This latter limitation, however, was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Societe Internationale v. Rogers.4 This case was part of the complex
Interhandel litigation in which the plaintiff, a Swiss holding company
also known as I.G. Chmie, brought suit under the Trading with the
Enemy Act for recovery of more than one hundred million dollars in assets
seized by the United States during World War II. The Government challenged the claim, asserting that Interhandel, although incorporated in
Switzerland, was an "enemy" within the meaning of the act (precluding an
"enemy" from recovering seized assets) due to its intimate connection
with I.G. Farbenindustrie, a German firm. At an early stage in the litigation, the Government moved for an order requiring the petitioner to
make available for inspection and copying a large number of the banking records of Sturzenegger & Cie. Not disputing the relevancy of these
documents, Interhandel contended that it did not have "control" over
them, as their production would violate Article 273 of the Swiss Penal
Code (relating to "economic espionage") and Article 47 of the Swiss Bank
Law (relating to secrecy of banking records). At the same time, the Swiss
Federal Attorney, deeming that production of the accounts would violate
Swiss law, confiscated them. This "confiscation" was essentially an order
not to remove the documents. A Special Master found that there was no collusion between Interhandel and the Swiss government in the "confiscation," and that Interhandel had made good faith efforts to comply with
the production order. The district court confirmed these findings, but
nevertheless held that Interhandel had control over the documents, ordered their production, and, upon Interhandel's noncompliance, dismissed the complaint under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 5
(2d Cir. 1964) (separate entity theory still valid as to funds transferred from New York
bank to Uruguayan branch).
3 R STATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAws § 94 (1934). (Emphasis added.) In SEC v. Minas
de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945), the court, relying on this section, modified
a subpoena requiring the production in Arizona of corporate books located in Mexico,
since compliance would have required a violation of Mexican law. As modified, the
subpoena ordered the corporation to apply to Mexican fiscal authorities for permission
to remove the books, or, in the alternative, to require the corporation to allow the
SEC to copy the books in Mexico, thus avoiding a violation of Mexican law.
4 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
5 Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D'.C. 1953).

ORDERING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the discovery
order.6 In so holding, the Court accepted the proposition that the district
court had power to issue the order, and emphasized the courts' duty to
carry out the policies of the United States as expressed by Congress:
In its broader scope, the problem before us requires consideration of the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy
Act....
In view of these considerations, to hold broadly that petitioner's
failure to produce the Sturzenegger records because of fear of
punishment under the laws of its sovereign precludes a court
from finding that petitioner had "control" over them, and
thereby from ordering their production, would undermine congressional policies made explicit in the 1941 amendments....
Rule 34 is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the exigencies of
particular litigation. The propriety of the use to which it is
put depends upon the circumstances of a given case, and we
hold only that accommodation of the Rule in this instance to
the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act justified the action of the District Court in issuing this production
order.7
The Court, however, reversed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that
rule 87 should not be construed to authorize dismissal where noncompliance with the order was due to inability rather than willfulness or
bad faith. 8 The significance of this decision lies in the fact that the Court
disregarded the strict territorial approach embodied in the first Restatement, Conflict of Laws. It should be noted, however, that the Court did
not make clear under what circumstances production orders violating
foreign law would be valid, when noncompliance with a production order
would be sanctioned, and in what manner, nor whether a subpoena
duces tecum could also be issued under similar circumstances.
In three recent cases involving subpoenas, the Second Circuit has not
followed the lead of the Supreme Court. FirstNat'l City Bank v. Internal
Revenue Service,9 involved records, physically located at the bank's
Panama branch, of a Panamanian corporation with offices both in Panama and New York City. The court refused to vacate the subpoena on
the grounds that Panamanian law had not been adequately proven. In so
holding, however, the court emphasized that had there been such proof,
the subpoena would have been vacated.
6 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206 (1958).
7 Id. at 204-06.
8 Id. at 212.
9 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
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Ings v. Ferguson'O was one of the many cases resulting from the
"financial chaos and ruin left by Lowell M. Birrell when that gentleman
forsook these shores for those of our southern hemisphere neighbor,
Brazil."' In a proceeding ancillary to a chapter X reorganization in
California, the New York district court ordered the New York agencies
of certain Canadian banks to produce in New York records physically
located in Canada. The subpoenas were quashed by the court of appeals
as there was a possibility that compliance would have violated the laws
of Quebec province. Letters rogatory were issued, since "whether removal
of records from Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian law and
is best resolved by Canadian courts."' 2
The latest of these decisions, Application of the Chase Manhattan
Bank,' 3 approved the modification of a subpoena duces tecum directing
the bank to produce records in possession of its Panama branch in violation of Panamanian law; the modified subpoena merely required the
bank to cooperate with the Government in obtaining the records by
application to Panamanian authorities. The court explained its decision
in these terms:
The Government, as well as other litigants, has a real interest in
civil and criminal cases in obtaining evidence wherever located.
However, we also have an obligation to respect the laws of other
sovereign states even though they may differ in economic and
legal philosophy from our own. As we recently said in modifying
subpoenas duces tecum in another case, "upon fundamental
principles of international comity, our courts dedicated to the
enforcement of ojar laws should not take such action as may
cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the
least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures." Ings v.
Ferguson .... 14
The tenor of this language is at variance with the Supreme Court's
explicit holding in Societe Internationale.Moreover, the reasoning suffers
from its broad reliance on "fundamental principles of international
comity." The term "comity" has been used in so many senses15 that it
10 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
11 Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1961).
12 Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960). The lower court had already
quashed in part subpoenas duces tecum directing the New York agencies of certain
foreign banks to produce documents from Cuba upon evidence that compliance

would have subjected the banks' employees in Cuba to criminal penalties. In re
Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
'3 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
14 Id. at 613. (Emphasis added.)
15 The origin of the doctrine may be attributed to Ulrich Huber (1636-1694) of the
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can hardly be considered a very firm principle upon which to base
judicial decisions. At least three interpretations can be found in the
writings of courts and theorists: (1) That comity is merely an expression
of politeness or courtesy on the part of the nation recognizing the
foreign law;' 6 (2) that by comity the foreign law becomes a part of the
legal system of the nation applying it;17 or (3) that comity is really a sort
of reciprocal recognition by friendly nations of one another's laws.' 8 The
last of these alternatives represents the traditional American view, and
was early expressed by Mr. Justice Story, whose conception of reciprocity
was based not only on convenience and utility, but also on the moralistic
precept "do unto others as you would have done unto you."' 9
Dutch School, who employed it to "modify and temper the vigorous application of
territorial law and to accord recognition to foreign law on local territory." KUHN,
COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1937). In DE CONFLICTU LEGUM, Huber laid down the three maxims which came to be the basis of the
American doctrine of conflict of laws. Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y1. INT'L L. 49 (1937);
See Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REv. 372 (1919). For a collection
of some of the many attempts to define "comity," see Hanzard, U.S. Antitrust Process
Beyond our Borders: Jurisdiction and Comity, NEw YORK BAR ASs'N, SECTION ON
ANTITRUST LAW, SYMposIuM 44, 47-50 (1953).
16 This has been the position generally taken by the continental jurists. Davies,
supra note 15, at 57.
17 Livermore, the first American writer on the subject, seems to have taken this view
in DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHIcH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE
POsrrIvE LAws or DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (1828). See Kuhn, op. cit. supra note

15, at 30. A later American theorist explicitly adopted this position, saying: "If we
understand by 'comity' simply politeness, meted out either at the caprice of the judge,
or granted in consideration of similar concessions by the state whose law is for the
particular case accepted, then 'comity' is not the true foundation on which our
acceptance of the rules of private international law rests. For when a foreign law binds
a particular case, then it becomes part of our common law, and the parties are
entitled of right to have it applied." WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1, at 6 (3d ed.
1905).
18 See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 35, at 34 (Ist ed. 1834).
19 In his treatise on the conflict of laws, Story expressed his view in the following
manner: "It has been thought by some jurists, that the term, 'comity,' is not
sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to foreign laws, when
they are not prejudicial to their own rights and interests. And it has been suggested,
that the doctrine rests on a deeper foundation; that it is not so much a matter of
comity as of paramount moral duty.... The true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest, is, that the rules, which are to govern, are
those, which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences,
which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do
justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return ..
" Id. at §§ 33, 35, at
34. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the Supreme Court held that comity did
not require an American court to give conclusive effect to a French judgment for want
of reciprocity on the part of France. The Court stated: "In holding such a judgment,
for want of reciprodty, not to be conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we
do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one person by reason of injustice
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In addition to these definitional problems which were bypassed by the
Second Circuit, it does not appear that any available interpretation
justifies the generalization that the "fundamental principles of international comity" do preclude our courts from taking an action that may
20
cause the violation of the laws of a foreign country.
It is submitted that any discussion which proceeds from "comity" fails
to grapple with the competing policies which arise when a court is asked
to order the production of protected documents. On the one hand, the
forum state has a strong interest in basing its judgment on all relevant
information. On the other, it has an interest in not forcing the violation
of foreign law. "Comity" recognizes 6nly the latter interest, and then
only from the point of view of proper interstate relations. But the domestic interest in full disclosure of facts in litigation is equally relevant
and must not be disregarded. Recent authority has recognized this tension and the inadequacies of prior mechanical rules. The Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws has replaced its original rule with a pronouncement significant in its omission of any restrictive clause or any reference
to the laws of another state: "A state can order a person, who is subject
to its judicial jurisdiction, to do an act in another state." 21 The proposed
done to another; but upon the broad ground that international law is founded upon
mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles of international law recognized
in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is our
judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered
conclusive." Id. at 228. The New York Court of Appeals, in Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 285 N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923),
stated in a similar vein: "Comity may be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one
member of the family of nations owes to the others. . . . We do justice that justice
may be done in return." But cf., Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States
Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.) (doctrine of reciprocity
confined to foreign judgments).
20 "Comity persuades; but it does not command." Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg.
Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900).
21 R.STATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFriar oF LAws § 94 (rent. Draft No. 4, 1957). Note,
however, comment (c) to this section: "Only in a most extreme situation, will a person
be ordered to do an act in a state which is contrary to that state's criminal law. Such
an order would not be conducive to the maintenance of harmonious relations between
the states involved. It would also be unfair to the defendant, since it would place him
in the dilemma of either obeying the order and thus rendering himself liable to
punishment at the hands of the state where the act was done or else of subjecting
himself, through disobedience of the order, to the risk of being held guilty of
contempt by the original court.
"A court will also be extremely reluctant to order the defendant to doan act in a
state which might subject him to civil liability under that state's law. This is
particularly true in a situation where it is likely that the defendant would be
enjoined by a court of the second state from doing the act which he had been
ordered to do by the forum. In such a case, the defendant could not obey one court's
order without subjecting himself to the risk of being held guilty of contempt by the
other." This caveat emphasizes the hesitance of the drafters to depart from the
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official draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations is more explicit:
"A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce rules of law is not
precluded from exercising such jurisdiction solely by the fact that exercise
requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under
the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that conduct."

22

It should be mentioned at this point that laws inhibiting the removal
of documents or the disclosure of their contents vary greatly. Some are
purely technical or procedural, requiring that books and documents be
kept at certain places (generally to be available for inspection by fiscal
authorities).23 Waiver of these statutes should not be too difficult to obtain. Other laws (statutory and administrative) specifically prohibit the
removal or copying of business books or documents pursuant to a foreign
judicial or executive order; the sanctions provided may vary from a small
fine to imprisonment. 24 These laws are in part a manifestation of foreign
misunderstanding and even distrust of American discovery procedures
and antitrust policies, in part, a means of encouraging foreign investment
which seeks the advantages of such laws and, in part,, a reaction to what
traditional rule. Compare the approach of the RESTATEMENT, THE
LAW OF THE UNrIED STATES, § 89 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

FOREIGN RELATIONS

22 RESTATEMENT, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 39 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). Comment (c) to this section is as follows: "Except in situations
in which the rule stated in § 40 [see note 31 infra] applies, the nature of the sanctions
by which the rules of the respective states are enforced does not affect applicability of
the rule stated in this Section. The rule applies in situations of criminal and civil
liability, for violation of statute or breach of contract and also when the sanction takes
the form of enforcement of a specific court decree or administrative order."
23 E.g., Panama: Art. 93 of Law No. 17 [1961] provides that business documents
must be kept at a merchant's establishment and cannot be removed from the country.
The maximum fine for a violation is 100 Balboas (approx. $100). Quoted in Application of The Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962).
Mexico: Art. 65, Ley General del Timbre (Stamp Act) provides that account books
must be kept in the taxpayer's office, unless in the possession of judicial or fiscal
authorities. Art. 228 (xv), C6digo Fiscal de la Federacin provides that failure to keep
books or other documents required by the laW in the places specified in the fiscal
laws constitutes an offense punishable by fine. Quoted in SEC v. Minas de Artemisa,
150 F.2d 215, 218 n.8 (9th Cir. 1945). If a waiver cannot be obtained, it is generally
possible to have copies of the documents made, or to allow inspection at the foreign
situs without incurring a violation of the law. But see Art. 89 of Law No. 17 [1961]
(Panama), infra note 24.
24 E.g., The Business Records Protection Act, ONTARIO Rv. STAT. ch. 44 (1950),
provides that no person shall in compliance with the order of a foreign authority take
or send or cause to be removed from Ontario any business or corporate documents.
A violation may be punished with up to one year's imprisonment.
Art. 89 of Law No. 17 [1961] (Panama) provides for a fine of up to 100 Balboas as
punishment for anyone who allows reproductions to be made of business documents
for use in an action abroad in compliance with the order of foreign authority. Quoted
in Application of The Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962).
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is considered an intrusion upon the sovereignty of the nation involved.2 5
Finally, there are the laws relating to the disclosure of banking or other
business secrets, motivated by similar concerns, the violation of which
may lead to both civil liability and the criminal sanctions of fine and
26
imprisonment.
Once it is recognized that "there is no jurisdictional limitation, strictly
speaking, that the defendant should not be ordered to do an act in a
state which is contrary to that state's law,"27 and that any limitation on
the power of the court to issue such an order "is more in the nature of
a self-imposed, than a jurisdictional limitation," 28 it becomes clear that
it is unnecessary to be bound by an arbitrary rule when another course
29
of action is more likely to lead to a just resolution of a controversy.
25 E.g., the reaction of the governments of the United Kingdom, France, the
Netherlands and Belgium, where the respective governments informed the companies
involved that compliance with subpoenas duces tecum issued in connection with the
international oil grand jury investigation, would violate the laws of their respective
countries. See In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952). See also Economic Competition Law Art. 30 (Netherlands) [1956]: "Except in
cases where an exemption or, upon request, a release has been granted by Our
Ministers, it shall be prohibited wilfully to observe within Dutch Territory measures
or decisions of another State which concern regulations on competition, positions on
economic power or economic competition practices." Cf. Gill, Problems of Foreign
Discovery, in BREWSrr., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 474, 482-83 (1958).
For an example of foreign objections to American discovery methods, see Radio Corp.
of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618.
26 E.g., Art. 47 of the Swiss Banking Code provides for a punishment of up to
20,000 Swiss francs and/or up to six month's imprisonment, for anyone who "violates
the duty of absolute silence with respect to a professional secret. . . ." Art. 273 of
the Swiss Criminal Code provides for imprisonment as a punishment to anyone who
makes trade secrets accessible to foreign governments or private entities. The judicial
definition of "trade secret" is "any fact which the person in possession of it considers
worth keeping secret. The unauthorized transmission of information about bank
accounts to a foreign authority clearly constitutes this offense." Friedrich, The
Anonymous Bank Account in Switzerland, 79 BANKING L.J. 961, 963-64 (1962). Furthermore, the violation of any person's right to the secrecy of his economic affairs, is an
actionable tort under Art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code and Articles 41 and 49 of the
Swiss Code of Obligations. These articles provide for money damages and other
reparations. Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 284, 288 (1955); cf. Record, vol. 1, pp. 405-12, Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). The law of Panama was recently changed to
provide for coded bank accounts and the secrecy of bank accounts. Law No. 18 of
Jan. 28, 1959.
27 Reporter's Note to § 94, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, op. cit. supra
note 21, at 9.
28 Ibid.
29 Two recent articles, Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel
Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1441 (1963), and Note, Subpoena of
Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdiction Where Law of Situs Prohibits Removal,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 295 (1962), assume, without discussion, that a party may be compelled
to violate a foreign law. While this is the position taken here, it should be recognized
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The fault inherent in the mechanical application of an inflexible rule to
the question of production is that such a rule can rarely achieve optimum
results without working undue hardship on some parties. If the rule is
that the documents must be produced under all, or alternatively, under
no circumstances, in the one case, some parties will be placed in jeopardy
for little reason; in the other, some parties who might easily have complied will not need to do so. Rather, the rule adopted should be the one
most likely to place before the court all the relevant documents which
can be produced without undue hardship to any party. Thus what is
required is a rule balancing the interest in not ordering the violation of
the laws of a friendly sovereign against the isterest in obtaining certain
information. 30 Admittedly it is not easy to administer a rule founded
upon a balancing of conflicting interests, but a court could readily do so
upon making the following determinations:
(1) As to the necessity of the requested documents or information to the
achievement of just results;
(2) As to the effect of the issuance or nonissuance of the proposed order
upon the fulfillment of national policy objectives;
(3) As to the possible consequences faced by the party complying with
the order (including the possibility of waiver by the foreign authority of
enforcement of the law); and
(4) As to the availability and effectiveness of alternative procedures
whereby the desired information could be obtained. 31
that current opinion on the problem is hardly uniform. See 39 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS
347-63 (1962) (consideration of RESTATEmENT, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 39, 40 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)); 34 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 359-68

(1957) (consideration of

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 94 (Tent. Draft

No. 4, 1957)). See also In re Von Kantzow's Patent, [1944] Ch. 318; and the Prize
Cases: The Kronprinzessin Victoria, [1919] A.C. 261; The Baron Stjernblad, [1918]
A.C. 173; The Consul Corfitzon, [1917] A.C. 550.
*
30 A rule based on similar considerations has been evolved to govern the determination of the admissibility of privileged communications when the forum does not
recognize the privilege being asserted. In such a case, especially when the forum's
substantive law governs, the privilege is generally not recognized. This result is
reached since the forum has a strong interest in obtaining answers to questions of fact,
and has no interest in fostering the type of confidential communications encouraged
by the jurisdictions advocating the privilege in question. See 8 WIGMORE, EVMENCE
§§ 2285, 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 597 (1934);
Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction,
36 COLUM. L. REv. 535 (1956).
31 REsrATEMiENT, TaE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, op. cit. supra
note 22, at § 40, offers a balancing of interest test: "Where two states have jurisdiction
to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they prescribe require inconsistent
conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law to
consider, in good faith, the possible moderation of the exercise of its own enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as: (a) vital national interests of the states,
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The relevance of the first consideration is hardly disputable. It would
serve no discernible purpose to order violation of the laws of a friendly
nation in order to obtain unneeded information. 2 The second consideration involves examination of the policies underlying the legal questions
being litigated. For example, in Societe Internationale,examination of
the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act was crucial to
the Court's approval of the issuance of the discovery order.38 This examination is necessary because courts react to the same problem in different
ways depending upon the context in which the problem is presented. The
realization of some policies is considered by the courts to be more important than the fulfillment of others. There, perhaps, lies the most
reasonable explanation for the varying results reached by the Second
Circuit. Although in FirstNat'l City Bank34 the reason given by the court
for not vacating the subpoena was that foreign law had not adequately
been proved, the litigation involved income tax evasion, and perhaps the
court was willing to go to greater lengths to enforce the income tax
laws, than it was in Ings v. Ferguson35 to obtain documents in a proceeding ancillary to a chapter X reorganization. This variance is emphasized
by the wholly different attitudes taken by the court in the two decisions.
Whereas in FirstNat'l City Bank the court expressed dissatisfaction with
the thought that foreign law should cause the subpoena to be vacated, 6
in Ings the court was willing to vacate the subpoena merely on a showing
that compliance "may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighrespectively; (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (c) the nationality of the person; and
(d) the extent to which the enforcement action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state." These criteria
cannot adequately guide a court's determination of the problem presented. First, it is
not the function of a court to make determinations as to the national interests of
foreign nations; see text accompanying note 52 infra. Second, the nationality of the
party subject to the order does not seem to be a relevant consideration; indeed, a rule
giving preferential treatment to foreign corporations in the courts of the United States
would hardly seem desirable. Third, the power of a court to enforce its orders is as
irrelevant a consideration here as in other cases where potentially unenforceable
judgments are entered.
32 In Societe Internationale the records in question might have had "a vital
influence on this litigation insofar as they shed light upon petitioner's confused background." 357 U.S. at 205. The approval by the Supreme Court of the issuance of the
discovery order in this case was probably due in no small measure to this consideration.
33 357 U.S. at 204-06; see text accompanying note 7 supra.
34 First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960); see text accompanying note 9 supra.
35 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); see text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
86 "If the Bank cannot, as it were, serve two masters and comply with the lawful
requirements both of the United States and of Panama, perhaps it should surrender
to one sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom." 271 F.2d at 620.

1964]

ORDERING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

bor. . . ."37 If such considerations were instrumental in the outcome of
those cases, the court should have enunciated them, and the principle
emerging would be the supremely rational one that a court is and should
be more willing to issue an order to produce if the national policy objectives are vital than if they are not.8s Finally, the lack of national policy
considerations might also go far toward justifying entirely different results
when litigation involves only private parties disputing a private matter.
Consideration of the consequences to be faced by the party complying
with the order is a natural duty of the court. If no consequences to the
party were to ensue from compliance, there would be no reason for the
court to refuse to issue the order; thus it is essential that the court explore the possibilities that the party may obtain a waiver by the foreign
government of enforcement of the foreign law.3 9 If a waiver is not forthcoming, it is self-evident that a court will be much more reluctant to order
a party to commit an act which might subject him to severe criminal
liability than if the potential liability is merely the payment of a small fine.
As a final consideration, the court should investigate the availability of
alternative procedures whereby the desired information may effectively
be obtained. If an effective alternative exists, the court should consider
action along the alternative line, as it is always preferable to pursue the
lines of conduct least likely to offend friendly sovereigns. Generally these
alternative procedures involve the issuance of letters rogatory or the taking of depositions. 40 But sometimes more informal procedures are suggested, such as appointment of an independent investigator to examine
the documents ordered produced. 41 Although the use of these alternatives
87

282 F.2d at 152. (Emphasis added.)

38 It has been urged that the policies underlying the Sherman Act, that is, the

reconciliation of competition and cooperation, require overriding the policies of
foreign nations against removal or disclosure of documents, whenever production of
documents involves an antitrust action. Emmerglich, Antitrust Jurisdiction and the
Production of Documents Located Abroad, 11 RacoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 122, 131-34

(1956).
39 This procedure was utilized in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1, 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the court ordered defendants to attempt to obtain waivers of
foreign restrictions on removal of documents, and provided that if these efforts failed,
the good faith of the defendant's attempts would be adjudicated in an appropriate
hearing.
40 See the comprehensive treatment of the problems arising from the use of these
procedures in Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a
Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Smit, International Aspects of Federal
Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. R.y. 1031 (1961).
41 In the Societe Internationale case, the Swiss government offered a plan designed

to achieve maximum compliance with the discovery order. The plan involved the
appointment of an independent investigator who would sift the documents in question,
and then submit a report to the court identifying the "relevant" documents. Record,
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may seem to provide the best of all possible solutions, it should be kept
in mind that these procedures are often expensive, time-consuming and
ineffective: "The difficulties surrounding the securing of evidence abroad
are such as to confound any general practitioner not experienced in such
matters. Even to one who has the necessary experience, the delays and
red tape involved in an effort to secure such evidence create a formidable
psychological barrier in the prosecution of a litigation." 42 If in spite of
delays and red tape the court deems it preferable to resort to one of these
alternative procedures, 43 it should take cognizance of the fact that the procedures will often be ineffective due to the foreign court's refusal to
cooperate in furnishing the aid requested in the letters rogatory.4 4 Also,
some countries will not permit the taking of depositions on their territory,
and others, if they permit the taking of depositions, will not allow specific
American procedures such as cross-examination of witnesses or the taking
45
of a full transcript of the hearing.
By applying these determinations to a particular factual situation, a
court should be able to resolve which of the competing interests should
be given greater weight. In Societe Internationale,46 the documents demanded were of vital importance, the Trading with the Enemy Act
clearly expressed congressional policy that seized property was only to be
returned if the claimant was unconnected with the enemy during the
war and the proposed alternative procedures for discovery were deemed
unacceptable by the court; however, the potential consequences to the
claimant for violating Swiss law were severe indeed. Under the analysis
vol. 5, pp. 1951-55; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20, 40-42. This plan was not accepted by
the district court. 357 U.S. at 203.
42 Heilpern, ProcuringEvidence Abroad, 14 TUL. L. REv. 29 (1939). It would seem
that these difficulties have not yet diminished: "The existent machinery the American
lawyer has at his disposal is expensive, cumbersome and most uncertain." Doyle,
Taking Evidence by Deposition and Letters Rogatory and Obtaining Documents in
Foreign Territory, ABA, SEcnoN OF INTMURATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE Lw 37, 49
(1959).
43 See, e.g., Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 121 F. Supp. 420, 425-26
(D.D.C. 1954) (court ordered issuance of letters rogatory over Alien Property
Custodian's objection that the difficulties to be encountered by resort to such procedures would prevent effective discovery).
44 See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618 (English
court refused to order oral examination of witnesses and production of documents
pursuant to letters rogatory issued by an American court, on the ground that the
discovery sought therein was "indirect" rather than "direct" material, and thus
unavailable under English law). In a case involving Panama it is doubtful that
Panamanian courts would be very cooperative, as their secrecy laws were passed in
order to create a haven to attract foreign capital.
45 See generally Doyle, supra note 42; Jones, supra note 40, at 519-22; Smit. supra
note 40, at 1058.
46 See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text.
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here suggested, the Supreme Court correctly decided that the last was
outweighted by the combination of the first three considerations.
In the First Nat'l City Bank case, 47 the court also reached the desirable
conclusion, but for the wrong reason. There is a strong national policy
against tax evasion, the documents subpoenaed were essential to establish a case against a delinquent taxpayer and the potential consequences
of violating the law there involved were relatively insignificant. Unless
the Bank had proposed an alternative procedure which would have
achieved effective production of the documents, the subpoena should
have issued whether or not foreign law was adequately proved.
In Ings v. Ferguson48 there was no reason to vacate the subpoena
merely because compliance might have resulted in the violation of foreign law unless it were shown that employment of alternative procedures
would achieve substantially the results that would be achieved by issuance
of a subpoena. However, if in this situation it were proved that compliance with the subpoena would definitely result in a violation of
Canadian law, perhaps resort to alternative procedures would be more
justifiable than in First Nat'l City Bank, since the documents requested
in Ings could well be less essential to carrying out the policies underlying
the Bankruptcy Act, than were the documents in First Nat'l City Bank
to fulfillment of the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code.
In light of this analysis, therefore, it is clear that the court in the
Chase ManhattanBank case 49 was only justified in vacating the subpoena
if it were shown that alternative procedures would be equally effective
in obtaining the requested information, or, if due to the nature of the
grand jury investigation, the documents were not necessary to the conduct
of the investigation and the policy considerations were not substantial.
The essential nature of a test based on these determinations is not
greatly dissimilar from those recently utilized in solving problems of
domestic conflict of laws, where some courts have turned from the results
demanded by strict application of territorial concepts, to a test based on
a balancing of conflicting interests. 50 It should be noted, however, that
47 First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
48 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
49 Application of The Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).

50 These have been cases raising constitutional issues, see Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). Cf. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963), adopting en banc, opinion of
Kaufman, J., dissenting, in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 136 (2d
Cir. 1962); Currie, The Constitution and The Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CH. L. REv. 9 (1958). Cases presenting ordinary
conflicts problems are often still resolved by traditional Restatement rules.
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the domestic "balancing of interests" test is not entirely viable in an
international context. The problem here presented is one of the few
exceptional cases where the positive commands of two sovereigns are in
absolute conflict. Here, the forum state is never disinterested. Furthermore, whereas the unifying effect of the full faith and credit clause makes
possible the resolution of domestic conflicts "by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight," 51 a determination of the national interests of
each foreign state whose laws are involved in litigation, is not a function
of the courts, but the responsibility of the executive branch. 52 In view
of the possible consequences to the foreign relations of the United States
resulting from a court's ordering the production of documents from a
jurisdiction in violation of the laws of that jurisdiction, the executive
branch should be consulted by the court, not only as to the interests of
the United States in the litigation, but also as to what may constitute
the interests of the foreign government whose laws are involved.5 3 One
court, indicating that the foreign policy implications of its decision
would not deter it from proceeding, stated very clearly, and it is submitted, properly, that
If necessary, the Court will not hesitate in future proceedings
to seek advice and clarification of the Government's position by
calling in government officials capable of advising the court. It
must be remembered that the responsibility of the Court is to
51 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
52 See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111

(1948): "[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." Cf. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918): "To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to
be reaxamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly
'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.'"
The proposition advanced in this comment would not involve an examination by
American courts of the validity of an act of a foreign state, see Banco National de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), but would instead, accepting the validity of
that law, balance the interest in complying with it, against the interest in obtaining
the documents.
53 Any department of the executive branch may bring to the attention of the court
that department's views and policies by requesting the Attorney General to file a
Suggestion of Interest pursuant to 16 Stat. 162 (1870), 5 U.S.C. § 316 (1958). See, e.g.,
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325
F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor, 56 AM. J.
INT'rL L. 633, 676-77 (1962).
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protect not only those appearing then, but also to protect the
American public who have a vital interest in all proceedings.5 4
Undoubtedly situations may arise where the court's order is met by a
strong negative reaction abroad. This reaction may even take the form
of foreign legislative,55 judicial a s or executive57 action. However, the
assessment of such a possibility is no more the proper function of the
court than is the determination of a foreign government's interests. Once
again, this matter is within the province of the executive branch from
which the court can receive advice. Furthermore, even after such a court
order had been issued, were a strong foreign reaction to ensue, the executive branch could advise the court as to whether in its opinion national
policy objectives would be better served by vacating or by leaving the
order in force. It must be emphasized, however, that the question of
whether or not to issue the production order is a judicial one. The advice of the executive is only solicited in order to aid the court in arriving
at its decision. Thus, if the consultation machinery breaks down or if the
executive prefers to remain uncommitted on an issue,58 the court still has
the responsibility of balancing the competing policy considerations and
reaching a decision.5 9
54 In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 283 (D.D.C.

1952).
55 When subpoenas were served on Canadians and Canadian corporations engaged
in the newsprint industry, to appear and produce documents before an American
grand jury, great public indignation was aroused in Canada; the legislature of
Ontario went so far as to pass a special statute prohibiting the removal of documents
from Ontario in compliance with an order of a foreign judicial, legislative or administrative authority. A violation of this statute is punishable by up to one year's
imprisonment. The Business Records Protection Act, ONTARIO REv. STAT. ch. 44 (1950).
50 In United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
an antitrust suit brought against Du Pont, ICI and other nylon manufacturers, the
district court ordered ICI to license certain patents to all parties desiring them.
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd., the exclusive licensee of those patents in England,
successfully brought suit in England to enjoin breach of the contract granting it the
exclusive rights to the patents. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd., v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.). No further action was taken in the United States
against ICI for failure to comply with that part of the district court order.
57 See In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
There, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. was served with a subpoena duces tecum to produce documents before an American grand jury. The Minister of Fuel and Power of
Great Britain ordered the company not to produce any documents which were not
located in the United States. Id. at 289. Note also the "constructive confiscation" of
accounts in Societe Internationale; see text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
58 See, e.g., Record p. 402, Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
59 "Despite the broad statement in Oetien that 'The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
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The great latitude that a court has in its power to apply sanctions for
noncompliance with a subpoena or a discovery order, is of course vital
to the effectiveness of its directives. The mere threat that sanctions
within the power of the court to apply shall be utilized will generally
intimidate a party into maximizing its efforts to comply. If the result
is compliance, the inquiry need be carried no further, as the objective
of obtaining the "fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial," 60 will have been attained. It is only after the fact of a party's
noncompliance that a court need determine whether in that particular
situation a certain sanction may constitutionally be imposed, and further,
whether the imposition' of that sanction would be desirable. This is a
determination which a court cannot make at the time of issuance of the
order to produce since at that time all the facts relevant to sanctioning
will not yet be before the court. Imposition of a sanction must be justified
on either a remedial or a punitive rationale and the sanction imposed
must be tailored to the purposes of these alternatives. If the reason for
the party's noncompliance is impossibility, it would be senseless to apply
sanctions as neither rationale is applicable. A party should not be punished for something that is not his fault; thus, if good faith efforts at
compliance are made, a punitive sanction would be indefensible. While,
if the action required of him turns out to be impossible, no sanction
would alter his good faith inability to comply; thus, sanctioning could
in no sense be remedial. 61 Therefore, it can readily be seen that it is only
when all the facts are present that a court can decide whether or not
remedial sanctions might bring about compliance and whether punitive
sanctioning would be justifiable. By thus delaying the decision as to
sanctions, courts can utilize their sanctioning power most effectively,
while at the same time being ensured of maximum efforts at compliance
62
on the part of the party ordered to produce.
If compliance is not achieved, a court has available, in a proper case, a
whole spectrum of remedies. Its power to apply some of these sanctions
is, however, subject to constitutional limitations. The following short
discussion of these remedies shall be restricted to those available to the
Legislative .. . Departments,' ... it cannot of course be thought that 'every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.'" Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
60 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
61 The "remedial" sentence is considered a civil punishment, even though it
includes fines and "coercive imprisonment."
62 See, e.g., In re Reicher, 159 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (IRS summons--question
of whether petitioner was excused from producing records was best determined in a
later contempt proceeding).
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federal courts, as few state courts are confronted with the issues which
are the subject of this comment. 3
In the case of a party's refusal to answer questions or allow discovery,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the court to make such
orders "as are just," among others, to enter orders establishing facts or
excluding evidence or striking pleadings, or authorizing judgments of
dismissal or default. 4 The court's power to apply these sanctions is not,
however, absolute.6 5 Especially the availability of default or dismissal
must be determined in light of the due process limitation enunciated in
Societe Internationale:
[We think that Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize
dismisal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance
with a pretrial production order when it has been established
that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.66
The rule here set down applies at least to default judgments in the case
of a defendant, and to dismissals in the case of a "quasi-defendant" or a
defendant cast in the role of a plaintiff.67 The rule should probably also
apply to dismissal in the case of a plaintiff having none of the character68
istics of a defendant.
63 Only one state case has been found which involved the production of documents
located at a situs the law of which prohibited their removal or the disclosure of their
contents. Hirshhorn v. Hirshhorn, 278 App. Div. 1006, 105 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1951).
64 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
65 The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. at 4325 (1952) state:
"The provisions of this rule [rule 37] authorizing orders establishing facts or excluding
evidence or striking pleadings, or authorizing judgments of dismissal or default, for
refusal to answer questions or permit inspection or otherwise make discovery, are in
accord with Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 . . . (1909), which distinguishes between the justifiable use of such measures as a means of compelling the
production of evidence, and their unjustifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S.
409 . . . (1897), for the mere purpose of punishing for contempt."
66 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958). (Emphasis added.) In
this decision the court laid to rest any artificial distinctions based on the alternative
use of refusal and failure to comply in Rule 37. Id. at 207-08. By the accepted
meaning of the word, Interhandel clearly refused to comply with the production order
for fear of prosecution under Swiss law, yet the Court labeled the noncompliance
a "failure to comply." Id. at 212.
67 Id. at 210.
68 A superficial analysis would seem to dictate the opposite, due to the argument
that in invoking the aid of the court a plaintiff seeking to alter the status quo submits
itself to all the orders the court might issue, and that if after such submission a
plaintiff disobeys an order, dismissal is warranted. The argument states a conclusion,
as the issue here is the propriety of the court's order of dismissal. A plaintiff who has
established a prima fade case would surely not be required to submit to any judicial
order. The question therefore is whether the rationale for dismissal for failure to
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The "constructive seizure" of the documents by Swiss authorities in
Societe Internationale established "inability" to comply with the discovery order insofar as the sanction of dismissal was concerned. However, the concept of "inability" is in this context a shifting one. Although
in Societe Internationale,Interhandel had shown the requisite "inability"
to avoid the sanction of dismissal, it was still subject to the lesser sanctions provided by rule 37-"It may be that in the absence of complete
disclosure by petitioner, the District Court would be justified in drawing
inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular events." 69 Thus noncompliance with a discovery order can result in some sanctions, even if
bona fide efforts to comply had been made; and even these lesser sanctions may well destroy a litigant's chances of success.
Inexcusable noncompliance with a subpoena is a violation of a citizen's
positive duty to act as a witness, or to produce evidence when called upon
to do so. 7 0 The power to punish such a violation stems from the court's
inherent power to punish contempt, 71 thus the choice of which sanction
to apply, and when, is almost totally at the discretion of the court. However, noncompliance with a subpoena which in all other respects is
valid, is still excused if inability is established:
Ordinarily, one charged for contempt of court for failure to
comply with a discovery order is logically any more applicable to a plaintiff who has
established a prima fade case, than to a defendant, when neither has acted wilfully or
in bad faith. The language of the Supreme Court does not indicate that any such
distinction will be made, id. at 210, and it is submitted that dismissal here is equally
unwarranted in the case of a plaintiff as is a default judgment in the case of a
defendant.
69 Societe InternatioAale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958). Later cases have not
adequately explored the question of what constitutes the requisite "inability" to
preclude a court from entering a judgment of default or dismissal upon noncompliance
with a discovery order. See Read v. Ulmer, 308 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir. 1962); Syracuse
Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959); Independent
Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Bernat v. Pennsylvania
Ry., 14 F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
If for purposes of dismissal or default judgment, "constructive seizure" of documents
established the requisite inability, perhaps authoritative statements by foreign officials
that action would be taken against a party if that party violates the foreign law, would
also be sufficient to prevent the entering of a judgment of default or dismissal. Perhaps
evidence that in past cases when a party had violated the law in question, foreign
officials had acted would also be sufficient. It must, of course, be clearly established
that the party had made bona fide efforts to comply; but even then, a mere showing
of the foreign law, without some affirmative action on the part of foreign authorities
would not seem to show the inability needed to preclude a judgment of default or
dismissal against the noncomplying party. See also Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate
PretrialDiscovery, 58 COLuM. L. Rxv. 480 (1958); Note, 46 CA iW. L. Rxv. 836 (1958).
70 United States v. Bryan, 389 U.S. 328, 31 (1950).
71 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
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comply with a court order makes a complete defense by proving
that he is unable to comply. A court will not imprison a witness
for failure to produce documents which he does not have unless
he is responsible for their unavailability ... or is impeding justice by not explaining what happened to them ....72
The inability referred to here, however, is an actual physical inability
to comply, and would not seem to encompass the "inability" established
in Societe Internationale. Thus, although good faith efforts to comply
73
with the subpoena must be made if noncompliance is to be excused,
no case has been found which has held that noncompliance must be
excused if bona fide efforts were made to comply with the subpoena. 74
The argument has been advanced that the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments 75 constitutes a limitation
on a court's power to punish for contempt. 76 As a general proposition
this would seem to be of doubtful validity, as the cruel and unusual
punishment clause has been very infrequently applied, is generally
thought to be a prohibition merely against torture and other barbaric
measures and is arguably only applicable to criminal as opposed to civil
remedies. 77 However, the possible existence of this constitutional limitation should be kept in mind by the courts, especially in applying punitive
as opposed to remedial sanctions. By careful application of sanctions,
especially by skillful use of remedial punishment, the courts should be
able to obtain substantial compliance with subpoenas and discovery
orders, even in those cases where the mere threat of sanctions did not
suffice to achieve the production of the desired documents.
With the spread of government regulation over an ever-increasing
group of activities, and with the expansion of international commercial
and cultural ties, the courts must abandon a rule based on territoriality,
72 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
73 United States v. Fleishman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.

323, 332 (1950). See also Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1954).
74 For a general survey of the power to punish contempt, see GoLDFAIm, THE CONTEMPrT PowER (1963).
75 U.S. CONsT. amend VIII.
76 The argument stems from the decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), in which the Supreme Court struck down a California statute imposing a
prison sentence for the "crime" of narcotics addiction. In holding the statute invalid
under the eighth amendment, the Court stated: "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the
question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold." 1d. at 667.
This proposition is advanced in Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to
Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1441, 1472-73 (1963).
77 See discussion in GOLDFARB, TnE CONTEMPT PoWER 264-73 (1963).
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which, although adequate in its time, is no longer suited to the exigencies
of the modern world.7 8 The adoption of the proposed approach to this
problem would not only assist governmental agencies to fulfill their roles,
but would aid the attainment of national objectives and facilitate litigation. At the same time, judicious application of the proposed rules should
not in the least disrupt the foreign relations of the United States, nor in
any way violate accepted principles of constitutional or international law.
78 A similar problem of extraterritorial application of court orders arises under the
antitrust and patent and trademark infringement laws of the United States. It often
occurs that compliance with a judgment in an antitrust or infringement action would
require -the defendant to incur liability both under foreign contract law and under
foreign regulatory and penal statutes. The actions taken by American courts faced with
these problems have also not been consistent. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), modifying, 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas).
70600 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 1962); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio
1954), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), supplementing, 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.
Ohio 1949), modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 63
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). See Note, Limitations on the
Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLuM. L. Rxv.
1441 (1963). For related questions, see United States v. First Natl City Bank, 321 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd en banc, 325 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Ross,
.302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962).

